





PIDS Policy Notes are observations/analy-
ses written by PIDS researchers on certain policy
issues. The treatise is wholistic in approach, and
like the PIDS Executive Memo, it aims to pro-
vide useful inputs for decisionmaking.
The author is Research Fellow at the In-
stitute. The views expressed are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect those of
PIDS or any of the study's sponsors.
Gilberto M. Llanto
Role of Microfinance Institutions
The country's Social Reform Agenda believes that microfinance institu-
tions have a large role to play in poverty alleviation. Indeed, some literature on
development finance report the unique and significant role played by microfinance
institutions in the "war against poverty." By providing the poor access to
microfinancial services, exempli gratia, microcredit and deposit-taking facilities,
microfinance institutions help break a crucial constraint faced by the poor.
Banks rarely lend, if at all, to the poor, mostly because of information
problems, high credit risk perception, lack of acceptable collateral and high
transaction costs of processing small loans. As in other developing
countries, this situation is true for the Philippines. As such, the
government responded by creating a number of credit programs
intended to provide the poor access to financial services. The Na-
tional Credit Council reports as many as 111 credit programs, 13
of which target the ultra poor. On the other hand, the private sector
approach is to use microfinance institutions (MFIs) such as credit
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), rural banks, cooperative
rural banks and credit unions/credit cooperatives to reach the poor.
However, despite the government's credit programs and the private
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sector's own approach to provid-
ing credit, the problem of lack of
access to microfinancial services
still persists.1
This Policy Notes issue does
not comment on the alleged role
of microfinancial institutions in al-
leviating poverty. Neither does it
discuss the supposed link between
poverty alleviation and the provi-
sion of access to microfinancial
services. Rather, it argues that
microfinance institutions must be
viable and sustainable institutions
to make any difference in the So-
cial Reform Agenda's "war against
poverty."2
Capacity to Deliver
Many MFIs involved in pov-
erty alleviation programs have
weak institutional capacity: they
lack a viable and sustainable de-
livery system. They have a rela-
tively small financial base and face
huge investment requirements in
staff training and client orientation.
All of these militate against any
attempt to reach a greater num-
ber of the target clientele in an
effective and efficient manner. In
the very short run, the MFIs may
be able to expand their present
reach because of donations and
other subsidies, but unless they
become viable and sustainable, the
effort cannot be sustained.
Critical attention should fo-
cus on four areas which affect the
operation of MFIs, namely:
p outreach,




p policy and regulatory
framework.
————————
1This shows that the solution of the poverty problem rests on more fundamental issues than
just the provision of microfinancial services alone. See various papers by Arsenio Balisacan, UP
School of Economics and Cristina David and Ponciano Intal, Jr., Philippine Institute for Develop-
ment Studies. The intention here is to focus on the need for viable and sustainable financial
institutions that offer financial products and services to the poor.
2This Notes draws from Gilberto Llanto, Edgardo Garcia and Ruth Callanta "An Assessment
of the Capacity and Financial Performance of Microfinance Institutions: The Philippine Case." A
paper submitted to the UNDP-Asia and Pacific Development Centre, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,
September 30, 1996.
3The other view is that the very nature of MFIs naturally draws this type of clientele—the
poor.
The principal problem faced
by credit NGOs is their lack of le-
gal personality and authority to act
as real financial intermediaries.
This results in a very limited ca-
pacity to develop and legally offer
innovative financial products and,
thus, hinder their growth as viable
and sustainable financial institu-
tions. More importantly, the infor-
mality of the organization makes
any attempt to mobilize deposits,
develop various financial products
and offer them to the public ille-
gal.
The second problem is the
lack of an extensive and viable fi-
nancial delivery system that has
substantial focus on the poor. While
the rural banks and credit coop-
eratives have a nationwide deliv-
ery system through their branches
and unit entities, only a few are
familiar with microfinance tech-
nologies and microfinancial mar-
kets as profitable opportunities. On
the other hand, a small number
of credit NGOs are trying to pro-
vide that delivery system, but they
remain small, institutionally weak
institutions.
Another problem area is the
training of potential clients. It is
common knowledge that a fair
degree of client training is neces-
sary for successful microfinance
programs. However, this requires
a sizable investment cost that MFIs
claim they may not be able to pro-
vide. The training of clients has
some public good characteristics
Expanding Outreach
MFI clientele remains small
and limited to poor borrowers and
savers who predominate the total
number, indicating an almost ex-
clusive focus on the poor. This
shows the effectiveness of the tar-
geting mechanism used by the MFIs
in identifying poor clients.3 How-
ever, several factors prevent MFIs,
especially credit NGOs, from reach-
ing a greater number of clients.olicy   Notes
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which should draw government
and donor assistance. Matching
government/donor funds with MFI
funds for training may lead to bet-
ter outreach performance as more
clients are trained over time.
MFI Viability
and Sustainability
To continually provide finan-
cial service to the poor, the MFIs
themselves must be viable and
sustainable. It should not be a case
of the blind leading another blind
wherein the end state will be the
collapse of MFIs and microfinance
programs. However, a recent
study shows that many of the MFIs
are far from attaining this goal.
A major factor in determin-
ing the viability and sustainability
of MFIs is their financial base.
MFIs—especially credit NGOs—
need to increase their equity, mo-
bilize more deposits and tap the
financial markets at reasonable
terms. Without a legal personal-
ity, however, credit NGOs cannot
obviously bring in the necessary
resources to turn them into viable
and sustainable institutions. The
alternative is to depend on grants
and subsidies, thereby making
them vulnerable to the agenda of
grant institutions. Thus, it is com-
mon to find relatively small MFIs
having several specialized loan
windows that cater to the donor's
target clientele. Other MFIs also
need to offer a wider array of fi-
nancial products to be able to stay
in the market.
Another factor is the MFIs'
internal financial policies and or-
ganizational practices and proce-
dures which need a lot of improve-
ment. Particular areas include fi-
nancial reporting and monitoring
systems, portfolio management,
assessment and management of
risks, product packaging and pric-
ing, and management of loan ar-
rears.
Relatedly, there is a need to
upgrade and institutionalize per-
formance standards, particularly
in loan repayment, evaluation of
loan defaults and aging of delin-
quent accounts, and the installa-
tion of appropriate accounting and
internal audit systems. In addition,
there is a need to improve their
capability for governance, leader-
ship and management.
Thus, the key issues in build-
ing viable and sustainable MFIs
consist of having
p the appropriate legal per-
sonality or authority,
p strong equity and finan-
cial base, and
p sound internal policies,
systems and procedures.
Resource Mobilization
Credit NGOs have attempted
to mobilize resources but the in-
formal character of their organi-
zation hampers the effort. There
is great dependence on grants and
subsidies from the government
and other donors which, ironically,
stunts their growth into viable and
sustainable financial intermediar-
ies. On the other hand, the coun-
try has yet to witness a vigorous
and sustained deposit mobilization
effort, especially among rural
banks, cooperative rural banks,
and credit unions or credit coop-
eratives.
To stay competitive and vi-
able, the MFIs must raise substan-
tial deposits and develop various
instruments and help their clients,
especially the small savers, build
up their financial base. Thus, they
not only have to mobilize tradi-
tional deposits but also broaden
and deepen the financial products
and services they offer to meet
existing demand at the lower end
of the financial market. This means
the development of new product
lines and services, and the design
and implementation of new
microfinance technologies and




The necessity of putting
credit NGOs under a supervisory
and regulatory framework cannot
be disregarded. Without such a
framework, the following problems
will persist:olicy   Notes
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p absence of performance
standards;
p lack of uniformity and
dilution of standards of
credit evaluation; and
p lack of portfolio supervi-
sion leading to poor loan
recovery and deteriora-
tion of its quality.
The lack of prudential regulations
over activities such as deposit-
taking creates moral hazard and
incentive problems. An appropri-
ate supervisory and regulatory
framework will complement the
building of institutional capacity of
MFIs, especially the credit NGOs.
This way, there will be strong MFIs
which will no longer operate in a
policy vacuum.
One way to build the capac-
ity of credit NGOs is to transform
them into formal financial institu-
tions. They can be organized into
rural banks, credit unions, or fi-
nance companies. The important
thing is to vest on them a legal
personality or authority which al-
lows them to undertake formal fi-
nancial intermediation activities
and to be subject to an oversight
public agency.
The immediate, and some-
times emotional, argument raised
against this view is that the trans-
formation of credit NGOs into pri-
vate banks, for example, will re-
sult in a loss of focus and sense of
mission for the poor. This argu-
ment does not seem to hold wa-
ter. One has to understand that the
focus, mission or goal of an orga-
nization is not necessarily dictated
by its organizational structure. On
the contrary, it is the people man-
ning the organization and the poli-
cies it pursues that provide focus
and direction. If the transforma-
tion of a credit NGO into a bank
distances them from the poor,
then, this only reveals the real
goals and focus of the people be-
hind the organization.
The alternative to a formal
supervisory and regulatory frame-
work is self-regulation by the credit
NGOs. The argument asserts that
maintaining an informal self-regu-
latory framework will provide
credit NGOs with flexibility and
initiative to pursue various finan-
cial innovations in order to reach
the poor. Furthermore, there will
be no danger of losing their focus
on the target clientele as a result
of the transformation of credit
NGOs into formal financial insti-
tutions. However, self-regulation
can only go so far. If incentives
are not appropriate and if there is
room for freeriding, self-regulation
cannot be assured. It will not be
enforced by some  deus ex
machina.
The transformation into for-
mal financial institutions may not
be everybody's cup of tea. It is
not for every credit NGO. There
will be some which will choose to
transform but there will be others
which will opt to remain as a de-
velopment agency and perhaps,
organize a bank with a distinct
charter, character and function.
The important outcome of this
strategy is the unbundling of de-
velopment and social preparation,
and banking functions which will
increase the efficiency of financial
markets and will provide the poor
greater access to financial services.
Thus, the NGO development
agency and the NGO-organized
bank or financial institution can
exploit their respective compara-
tive advantages. From the public
policy perspective, it becomes
clearer what activities in the MFIs
properly constitute "social devel-
opment costs" and what should
rightly be considered as "cost of
providing the financial service,"
that is, the cost of doing business.
The first set of costs may be sub-
sidized or given access to grants
in view of the externalities present
in social training/preparation of
poor clients while the latter should
be covered by appropriate pric-
ing of the financial product.
Recommendations
Based on the above argu-
ments, the following are recom-
mended:
p Transform credit NGOs
into full-fledged formal
financial institutions such
as private banks, finance
companies, nonstock sav-
ings and loan associa-
tions or credit coopera-




NGOs may organize or
invest in other formal fi-
nancial institutions;
p Build up the equity base
of MFIs by infusing more
capital from existing own-
ers and new investors;
p Diversify loans, savings
and other financial prod-
ucts/services according
to client demand;
p Maximize deposit mobi-
lization opportunities;
p Provide for an appropri-




p Maintain dialogue with
the government on the




p Promote linkage with pri-
vate banks interested in
providing microfinance
services for the poor
through MFIs whose in-
stitutional capacity must
be upgraded;
p Externalize the training
costs of the poor by pro-
viding MFIs access to
grants and government
financial assistance but
abiding by the principle
of matching grants with
MFI funds;
portfolio management,
risk assessment and man-
agement, product pack-
aging and pricing, man-
agement of loan arrears,
strategic and business
planning, among others;
p Improve systems and
procedures such as au-




standards, setting up in-
ternal audit systems, con-
duct of periodic manage-
ment audits, installation
of updated and standard-
ized accounting and re-
porting system;
p Continue among MFIs
staff training and devel-
opment of career paths
for capable workers, up-
grade pay scales and in-
centive schemes to retain
good personnel; and
p Professionalize manage-
ment and staff of MFIs. 4
p Rationalize government
credit programs and re-
allocate existing funds for
livelihood projects into
training the staff and
building the capacity of
existing MFIs following
the principle of matching
grants with MFI funds;
p Invest in training rural
banks, cooperative rural
banks and credit unions
or credit cooperatives in
microfinance technolo-
gies;
p Invest in the develop-
ment of new product





tion of the "best practices
in microfinance," and
others, with counterpart
funding from donors and
the government;
p Promote training in fi-
nancial operations, re-
source mobilization,
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